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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
early jurisprudence as exemplified by Bonnable v. First Munici-
pality27 was to the effect that a vendor warranted his vendee only
peaceable possession of the property sold. The present rule,
interpreting Civil Code Articles 2500-2501, that an eviction is not
a prerequisite to an action in warranty by the vendee against his
vendor as long as there exists a perfect outstanding title in a third
person, was established in Bonvillain v. Bodenheimer28 (which
overruled the Bonnable case). It has since been held that when
the vendee fails to prove an outstanding title in a third person
he cannot successfully sue to resolve.2 9 Since under the facts of
the instant case the minors probably did not have a perfect title,
it is doubtful that the vendee would have been sustained in his
action. It is interesting to note that in order to determine
whether there was perfect outstanding title in the minors the
court would probably have had to decide whether substantial
compliance with Act 209 of 193230 was sufficient.
The agreement between the parties herein provided that the
title must be merchantable. A title is not merchantable if it is
suggestive of serious future litigation. As the minors were shown
to have a claim with a substantial basis for future litigation, the
decision is in accord with the prior jurisprudence. However, it
is submitted that the court was not justified in refusing to deter-
mine whether or not substantial compliance with Act 209 of 1932
was sufficient. The fact that there was no jurisprudence pre-
viously determining the question should not deter the courts of
a civil law jurisdiction. Had the court decided this question in
the affirmative, a more equitable result might have been reached.
J. DOUGLAS NEsoM
TORTS-RIGHT OF PRIVAcY-An innocent citizen had been
charged with and acquitted of the supposed murder of the plain-
tiffs' father, though the body had not been discovered. Twenty-
five years later, the father's body, together with a will, was,
returned from another state. It was thus revealed that he had
not been murdered but had been residing in another state since
his disappearance. Years after his actual death, defendant's radio
station produced this story concerning the plaintiffs' father, and
the plaintiffs sued for invasion of their right of privacy. Held, the
passage of time could not give privacy to the acts of their father
27. 3 La. Ann. 699 (1848).
28. 117 La. 793, 42 So. 273 (1906); Comment (1940) 15 Tulane L. Rev. 122.
29. Kuhn v. Breard, 151 La. 546, 92 So. 52 (1922).
30. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4844-4847.
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because the story of his life was a part of the history of the com-
munity. Smith v. Doss, 37 So. (2d) 118 (Ala. 1948).
The right of privacy is "the right of a person to be free from
unwarranted publicity."1 There are no established legal limits
on the extent of this right, and, consequently, the courts must
use a variable formula to test each set of facts. The interest of
the individual in the privacy of his affairs is balanced against
the interest of the public in the dissemination of legitimate news
items. In the absence of extenuating circumstances, the courts
usually decide that an unusual contemporaneous event is the
subject of legitimate public interest. Thus, no invasion of privacy
was found when a woman committed suicide,2 a lawyer solved
a famous crime,3 a bartender was indicted under the alien and
sedition act,4 a picture which might have concerned a'crime was
printed,5 a group of two-hundred pound women were working
out with new gymnasium equipment,6 or a picture was printed
of a party to proceedings concerning custody of his children.7
In cases involving the revitalization of previously published
news the balance of interests is somewhat different. From the
plaintiff's standpoint his affairs have previously been exposed
to public scrutiny through the initial publication of the news
event now being revitalized; hence, his claim is to the right to
retreat from the public eye. The defendant's claim rests upon
the nature of the public interest, which the passage of time has
changed from an interest in common news to one in entertain-
ment.8 Thus the question becomes whether the public interest
in entertainment supersedes the private interest in withdrawing
ing from public surveillance. The courts speak in terms of
1. 41 Am. Jur. 925.
2. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App.(2d) 304, 95 P.(2d) 491
(1939).
3. Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N.Y.
Supp. 752 (1919).
4. Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.(2d) 467 (App. D.C. 1946).
5. Themo v. England Newspaper Pub. Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.(2d) 753
(1940).
6. Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. N.Y. 1936).
7. Bern v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn.
1948).
8. There are situations where the interest will not be in entertainment,
such as interest in the historical summary or the year's news in review.
In such cases, the court will probably impose the same test that it would
have in the initial publication of news events, and such rare cases should
not be confused with the present article.
The phrase "interest in entertainment" may appear vague. It is sug-
gested that an interest in entertainment is primarily an interest in emotional
enjoyment, while an interest in "news" is primarily an interest in factual
enlightenment or useful knowledge.
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whether the plaintiff has acquired a right of privacy, but the
basis of the decisions is the nature of the injury inflicted upon
the plaintiff. Though the court in the present case ruled that the
plaintiff could never acquire a right of privacy in a once famous
news event, two other courts have reached contrary decisions.
In Melvin v. Reid9 where a movie portrayed the life of a reformed
prostitute who had been acquitted of the murder of a third party,
the court allowed recovery for the invasion of the ex-prostitute's
right of privacy. A similar decision was reached in Mau v. Rio
Grande Oil, Incorporated,10 where the defendant produced a dra-
matic radio program depicting the robbery and shooting of the
plaintiff sixteen months before. In both these cases the courts
decided that the details of the notorious incidents were still the
subject of legitimate public interest, but recovery was allowed
because the plaintiffs' names were used in connection with the
facts." Since the plaintiffs' names were used in the present case,
it might seem that these decisions are at variance; considered
together, however, the three cases form a perfect pattern. In
the present case injury was inflicted only upon the plaintiffs'
interest in freedom from mental disturbance, but in the two pre-
viously decided cases, the plaintiffs suffered injury to other
interests as well.12 In the Melvin case the plaintiff's social status
was injured when her newly acquired friends, who knew of her
only as a virtuous woman, discovered that she had once been a
prostitute, while in the Mau case the plaintiff suffered the loss
of his job when he became so emotionally disturbed that he was
unable to carry out the duties of a chauffeur. Thus, though the
9. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
10. 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
11. It would appear that the court does not intend to limit recovery to
the use of the plaintiff's name, but that recovery will be allowed whenever
the news item is such that one can easily identify the plaintiff with the set
of facts. It is also doubted whether recovery would be allowed where the
name of the plaintiff was a common one, such as "John Smith"; for it would
be difficult to connect a set of facts with any, one person by that name,
unless the third party knew most of the plaintiff's life history.
12. It has been suggested that the basis of recovery in these previously
decided cases was the agency used and nature of the dissemination. See
Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy (1948) 48 Col. L. Rev.
711, 721. Though there is some basis for such an opinion when news is pub-
lished for the first time [Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers Inc., 188 Misc.
450, 65 N.Y.S.(2d) 173 (1946)], the present case suggests that this same dis-
tinction does not apply in cases involving the republication of events. As
indicated above, the primary public interest in revitalization of news, regard-
less of how it is disseminated, is in entertainment. And since In terms of
interest all cases involving republication of news events would fit into the
same category, there appears to be no logical basis for distinguishing the
radio from the newspaper, or the motion picture from television, when
determining the invasion of the plaintiff's right of privacy.
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public entertainment interest in the details of a previously pub-
lished news event will not be jeopardized by the passage of time,
the principal case indicates that the extent of this interest in
the identity of the person involved will vary with the nature of
the injury that would be inflicted if the news item were revital-
ized.12
In summary, the significance of the present case in the doc-
trine of the right of privacy relates to the revitalization of news
events. In such cases the court balances the public interest in
entertainment against the private interest in withdrawing from
public surveillance, and in this process certain guiding principles
appear to be established: (1) The details of the news event,
excluding the plaintiff's identity, will always be the subject of
public interest in entertainment. (2) If the identity of the plain-
tiff is also revealed, the extent of the public interest in entertain-
ment will vary with the nature of the injury which would be
inflicted upon the plaintiff. (a) If the plaintiff's interest in free-
dom from mental disturbance is all that would be invaded, the
court will probably say the plaintiff has not acquired a right
of privacy; however, (b) if there is more serious tangible injury,
the court will probably say that the plaintiff's interest in his
right of privacy is predominant.
WILLIAM R. VEAL
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-HAZARDOUS NATURE OF THE EM-
PLOYER'S BUSINESS-PROXIMITY TO CUSTOMER'S MOTOR VEHICLES-
Plaintiff was injured while loading a truck in the course of his
employment. He maintained that although the employer's retail
feed business owned no motor vehicles, it involved their opera-
tion, since all feed was sold directly to customers who drove
their vehicles to the place of business. Held, the mere fact that
employee was required as a part of his regular duties to be near
motor vehicles, which his employer did not own, operate or con-
trol, did not convert the business from nonhazardous to hazard-
ous. Fields v. General Casualty Company of America, 36 So. (2d)
843 (La. 1948).
In order for a business to be hazardous within the meaning
of the Workmen's Compensation Act,' it must either be specifi-
cally designated as such or must involve the use of a contrivance
1. La. Act 20 of 1914 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4391-4432]. For a complete
discussion of hazardous businesses, see Malone, Hazardous Businesses and
Employment under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law (1948) 22
Tulane L. Rev. 412.
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